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Early in Plato's ~\~\'nJPOSillnJ, the narrator Apollodorus says that the
banquet was given "when Agathon won the prize with his lirst tragedy,
the day after that on which he and his chorus olfered the san'dice
of victory" (Ii.'la).' In taking up the story of the evening, he tells
how Socrates, having stood outside lost in thought, linally comes to
Agathon's table halt'"ay through the meal. Agathon asl,s to share the
wise thoughts that have detained him, and there is some banter between
them as to who can claim to be wise. My wisdom, Socrates says, "is of
a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream. Hut yours
is bright and full of promise and was manill'sted in all the splendour
of youth the other day in the presence of more than thirty thousand
of your lellow Ilellenes" (Ii5e). Agathon acknowledges the mockery
in good spirit, and while urging Socrates to continue his supper, reters
the contest between them to the judgment of the god of tragedy and
drinking parties: as to "who bears oil' the palm of wisdom-of this
Dionysus shall be the judge" (17 .'it).
Much later in the evening, the speeches in praise of love have gone
the rounds to the point at which just two contestants remain, Agathon,
and last of all, Socrates. Again there is banter between them bef(lre
Agathon can make a start, lil!' Socrates suggests that he leels "fi'ight-
ened out of his wits" in having to lilllow such a line spealler (194a). As
fi.lf Agathon's rejoinder that he might he the one to feel disconcerted,
Socrates reminds him of the recent scene at the theatre when the dra-
matist came on stage with the actors I(l!' the formal ceremony bet(lre
the presentation of his plays and liKed the "ast audience altogether
undismayed (191.a-b). That is all very well, Agathon responds, but my
head is not so full of the theatre as not to lmow that a lew good judges
are much more f()rmidable than many I()ols. Of course, says Socrates;
but there is 110 l1eed fl)r you to worry fi)!' we, after all, "were part of
the foolish many in the theatre, hence cannot he regarded as the select
wise" (1 !J4c). Phaedrus comes to Agathon's rescue at this point, saving
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him fi-OIIl a prolonged Socratic inquisition and opening the way fiJr his
speech in praise of love. A poet and dramatist, Agathon calls on poets
and dramatists in his eulogy, Homer, Sophocles, and Euripides in par-
tictdar_ And when, in the course of noting love's virtues, he comes to
speak of knowledge and \\'isdom, he speal\s for poetry, saying that love
is a poet in the first place and the inspiret! teacher of poetry and of all
the arts, the creative source of living nature, and of what is best and
brightest among gods and men (195c- Wie).
Socrates, in complete cOlllmand of the situation, once more pleads his
nervousness in having to follow such a fine speech. Reautifi.d words and
diction, splendid rhetoric, comparable with the great master of rheto,-ic,
Gorgia.\~Agathon's speech has everything, Socrates says, except flJr
one thing: regard for truth! This time Agathon cannot escape Socrates'
sharp questions and he fights a losing battle until he moves to end the
exchange by admitting defeat: "I cannot refute you, Socrates; you're
quite unanswerable". "No", Socrates replies, "Socrates is easily refuted;
what you cannot rdi.lte is the truth" (201C-d). The philosopher then
leaves the poet to silence and goes on to tell his tale of love heard fi-OIIl
Diotima of :vIantinaea. Agathon and all the others are left far behind by
this speech, another case of the best wine being kept to the last. There
can be no doubt as to who carriet! oil' the palm of wisdom. The victory
of Socrates, to be understood as the victory of truth, is only confirmed
more handsomely when Alcibiades arrives late in the night and the
drinking begins in earnest.
The presentation from beginning to end is testimony to Plato's
t!ramatic skill, not least his ability to depict a scene with economy and
to sustain it across a series of speeches. The dialogue as a whole, it is
clear, points to a contest between the philosopher and the tragic poet
at a celebration in honour of the poet's moment of glory-though the
young Agathon is never a IWltch fl)r the 'old nlaster'. The ,S)'lIIposilllll in
this sense is a dramatic presentation of the "ancient quarrel hetween
philosophy and poetry" (Hepllhlic 607h), hut it all tal\es place in a spirit
of friendly rivalry. Notoriously, this spirit was not sustained in Plato's
discussion of poetry, especially tragedy, in a number of other major
dialogues.
In alluding to an audience of more than thirty thousand Hellenes
at the Dionysian lCstival (.~)'lIlpOSilim Ii 5e), Plato was exaggerating,
but not without point. This was the conventional number of Athenian
citizens and the usc of the figure, in Simon Goldhill's words, "indicates
more about the prestige and glory of the Great Dionysia than the pos-
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sible number of spectators",~Even so, the lillely numbers at the festival,
on well-attested estimates, would have been very larp;e-an audience
of perhaps fourteen thousand, easily the larp;est gathering in Athens,
of a size to support the idea that 'the whole city' was present. "Vhat is
to be recognised here is the extent to which the performance of Greek
tragedy became, from an early stage, an important component of the
Athenian democracy, bringing together religious. recreational, and
political life in one great celebratory festival each year in early spring,
In keeping with this, the state subsidised ticliets tiJr the less well ofl:
The interest of the polls thus helped to swell the crowds, a testimony
in itself to the importance of the event in the 1ifi~ of the city, On this
basis, the Great Dionysia. with the fllrlllal involvement of the state, the
tll/lding of choruses by wealthy citizens, the many public e"ents. choral
processions, ritual sacrifIces, the awanl of ci"ic and military honours,
the presence of distinguished fiweigners, all sUITounding the perfi)J'-
mance of the chosen tragedies, was the major expression of Athens
as a 'theatre-state', As is well known, a large element of theatre was
characteristic of the democracy as a whole, notably in the Assembly, in
the people's law courts, at religious festivals, and sporting events, This
association of tragedy and democracy in Athens is almost certainly a
critical fi\ctor in Plato's sharp-edged quarrel with poetry,
In the GOIg;as (50 le-50~d), Socrates argues that music and poetry,
including "that stately and man'e1lous creature, tragic drama" are con-
cerned only \\'ith the gratification of the audience, not its education or
moral improvelllent. Poetry in its essentials, above all in the theatre, is
portrayed as rhetoric in the t()rm of flattery, addressed indiscriminately
to a crowd of "lIlen, women, children, fj'eemen and slaves", In this, the
language of drama is (~quated with the flattery and demagoguery that
fIlls the Athenian Assembly. The association is echoed later in the Laws
ill the idea that aristocratic rule is replaced by an evil sort of "theato-
cracy"-rule, or misrule, by theatn.~abetted by the democracy (70Ia),
Tragedy, as Plato sees it, is the theatre that democracy was bound to
have, In this "ein, there is the contention in Hook VIol' the Republic
that the power of the crowd, in whatever public tiJrllln, constitutes the
greatest source of corruption in a society:
Are not the puhlic.. , the greatest of all sophists~ And do they not
educate to perfection young and old, IIlen and \\,Olllen alilie, alld fashioll
thelll after their 0\\'11 hearts:' .. , \Vhen they lIIeet together, alld the
\\'(,r1d sits down at all asselllbly, or ill a court of la\\', or a thl'atr!:', or a
calliI', or in allY other popular resort. and there is a great uproar, and
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they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other
things, equally exaggerMing both, shollting and clapping their hands,
and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they al'e assembled
I'edoubles the sound of the praise or blame-at such a time what
courage will be left, as they say, in a young man's heart? \Vill any
private training enable him to stand tinn against the overwhelming
flood of popular praise or blame~ (4!/2b)
In the assumed fi'amework of exclusions, a democratic culture has no
place for philosophical reflection, Mass gatherings drive out the good,
in art and political life as in thought, and the best arc likely to end up
corrupted by popular values, This hyperbolical denunciation of tragedy
as hand-in-glove with political misrule is given its strongest expression
at the end of Book VIII of the Republic, where the tragedians, especially
in the person of Euripides, are charged with encouraging, to their own
profit, the downward step beyond democracy into the lawlessness of
tyranny, \Vhat is portrayed is a symbiotic relationship between tragedy
and the worst forms of gO\'ernllJent in which each feeds off the other:
The tragic poets being wise men will lelrgive us and any others who
li\'e after our Inanner if we do not receive them into our State, because
they are the eulogists of tyranny.... But they \\'ill continue to go to
others cities and attract 1Il0bs and hire tillt: voices loud and persuasive,
and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.... :\10reover
they are paid lelr this and receive honour-the greatest honour, as
might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from dl'lnocra-
cies (5()"c-t)),
The dramatic power of Plato's writing in Book VIII is beyond question,
but the argument, especially in relation to democracy and its aftermath,
arguably runs ofr the rails in many ways, In writing of democracy, Plato
appears to have the Athenian democracy in mind (as at .'JG:Jb, .'J6.'ld-e), In
that case the portrayal of democracy as a permissive fi'ee-for-all, with
little or no social unity or respect for law, seems particularly wild and
hostile. In any case, no attempt is made to show how tragic drama and
its associated religious and cultural traditions could flourish in a society
of the kind he depicts, Again, the subsequent afliliation of tragedy with
tyranny lacks the slightest historical or textual basis, though a few
lines Ii'om Euripides arc pressed into service. Allowing that Plato has
genuine concerns about aspects of democracy and the elleers of tragic
theatre on political life in Athens, what he oilers is hardly a reasoned
criticism of either democracy or tragedy. Thus the account appears in
many respects as a denullciatory exercise in which the emotions of fear,
anxiety, and disdain figure prominently and cloud his judgment.
The even temper of Aristotle's approach to political and cultural
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concerns by contrast is characteristically dispassionate. Clearly, he could
not be described as an enthusiast lor democracy. But when he settles on
an account of citizenship in the Politics, he agrees that his definition is
"best adapted to the citizen of a democracy" (127 5b).3 More generally,
he is amenable to what could be called a maxim of collt'ctive wisdom in
espousing "the principle that the multitude ou~ht to be supreme rather
than the lew best":
For the many, of whom each illdi\'idnal is hilt an ordinary person,
when they met'! togetht'r Illay very lil,t'ly he beller than the few good,
if regarded not individually hut collt'rtively, just as a teast to which
many rontrihllle is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse.
For each individual among the many has a share of \'irllIt' and good
Sense, and wht'n they meet together, they bn'omc in a manner one
individual with many feet, and hands, and senses-a figure of their
character and thought (Poli/ics :1,1 I: I ~R I btl).
I Ie does not suppose that this happy outcome is universally true, lor it is
obviously not; but it is taken to be true enough to provide a justification
tor democratic forllls of government and for taking account of popular
choice in music and poetry. The whole political and cultural context f()r
Aristotle's consideration of tretgedy is thus a world apart from Plato's
fevered concern, a generation earlier, over the Athenian constitution
and the people's theatre. Aristotle is aware, of course, of the political
context of tragedy; but he is in a position II'here he is able to atlirm its
cultural setting as a whole and to cousider it, in ellect, in its own tenns
and to respond to it warlllly with admiration.
The contrast between heightened elllotion and callll appreciettion in
response to tragedy is subsequently apparent in the dillerent ways in
which the two philosophers depict the audience for tragedy, the huge
crowd that continued to flock to the Great Dionysia throughout the
f(Hlrth century. Aristotle's scattered conllllents on the audience in the
Poetics, and also in the Politics, could suggest some hesitation in regetrd
to his "collective wisdom" principle. At one point, in defence of Eurip-
ides, he appeals to audience acclaim as confirming his account of the
finest genre of tragedy (1+5:1a23-:10). But within a few lines he com-
plains about the success of sOllle tragedies which, he says, are more in
the manner of comedies: they are "ranked first only through the weak-
ness of the audiences; the poets merely lollow their public, writing as
its wishes dictate" (1·15,'3a:J:3-~35). There is no real inconsistency here,
however, for, as Stephen Halliwell COn1ll1ents, audiences may want less
than the best, and some poets will sed to play on this; but equally,
the audience can be got to respond to the best I,ind of tragedy which
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arouses the true tragic emotions:~ In this spirit, Aristotle ranks tragedy
above epic as an art lorm, against the view of those who argue that it
must be inlerior since it appeals to a wider and hence less ClIltivated
audience. (Interestingly, his argument bears comparison with the view
that cinema is superior to painting.)
It is true of course that Aristotle's attitude to the audience Ilx theatre.
and the arts more generally, is not without an air of disdain, as in his
distinction in the Politics between two kinds of spectators, "the one free
and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed of mechanics,
labourers and the like" (1 :l1-~a II:kW). Moreover, his whole account of
perlormance in the theatre lad,s Plato's vivid appreciation of its power
and signilicance. What his comments convey, nonetheless, is a sense of
the Athenian audience fl)r tragedy as generally well inlormed-better
inlormed in some respects than the critics-and capable of appreciating
good drama and beneliting Ii-om it. This stands in stark contrast with
Plato's references to "the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude,
whether in painting or music or politics" (Hepublic 'J.9::ld). with the
theatre crowd portrayed as seeking unrestrained pleasure and caught lip
in uncontrolled emotion. This contrast embraces, lilrthermore, entirely
ditlerent estimates of what good dramatists achieve in their presenta-
tion of human action within the bounds of happiness and misery, of
how tragic performance is related to a natural delight in works of
imitation. and of what typically goes on in the minds and emotions and
lives of an audience present, let us say, at a performance of the Oresteia,
Alltigolle, Philoeletes, Trojall If/olllell, or a play by Agathon. or one of the
poets of the lourth century praised hy Aristotle such as Astydamas
or Theodectes. (There were regular revivals of Aeschylus, Sophocles,
Euripides and others in the fourth century, constituting a 'classical'
canon; and there is evidence tl1<1t tragedy remained strong at least to the
end of the century.)
The divide with which I am concerned is drawn most sharply around
the respective attitudes of the two philosophers to tragedy and the
emotions. In Plato's case, this question is linked importantly with a
demarcation dispute concerning truth and wisdom; and disputes about
territories and boundaries, as we know, are li-equently charged with
emotion. The fundamental o~iection in the Hepllblic Bool, X to the tragic
poets and other imitators is that their kind of art corrupts the minds of
all who do not have the necessary antidote, the phamwkoll. which COII-
sists in knowledge of their true nature. Such IOlOwledge is the preser\"('
of the philosopher_ It 11)lIows that only the philosopher can said)' attend
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the theatre. The need for an antidote is stressed at the beginning of
the discussion (:>95b). Later. the (lower of the mimetic poet "to corrupt.
with rilre exceptions. even the better sorr" is remarlwd on (G05C); and at
the elHl. there is the proposal that the undoubted charm of poetry can
be overcome only by a counter-charm which will work in the following
way: whenever we find ourselves listening to poetry we should engage
in a philosophical chant about its dangers (G08a).
The corruptive f()rce of poetry lies precisely its power to sway the
emotions. especially pity. while impairing reason; specifically it draws us
into feelings that men of good sense would reject:
\\'hen we listen to some hero in Ilolller or on the tragic stage moaning
O\'er his sorrows in a long tinule, or to a chorus beating- their breasts as
they chant in a lament. you know how' the best of us enjoy giving our-
selves up to f(,llow the !wrformilnce with eager sympathy. The more a
poet can move our feelings in this way. the better we thinl, hilll. Aml
yet wben the sorrow is our own, we pride ourselves on being- able to
bear it quietly lil,e a lIIan. condemning the bcha\'iour we admired in the
theatre as wOlllanish. (G()[jc-d)
There are several levels to this argument. In the first place there is the
view that the appropriate emotional and moral response to great misf()r-
tune. the death of one's child for example. is to bear it with equanimity.
not to indulge in a display of sorrow. abm'e all not in the presence of
others. Lament. as is said elsewhere in the Republic. "is felr women.
and not vcry good w.omen at that. and inferior men" (.'188a). Secondly.
there is the unsuppol"ted "iew that what tragedy eflects in its audience.
through the mechanism of imaginative sYlllpilthy. is precisely the expe-
rience of unrestrained emotion, in feelings of grief; pity and fear. The
argument moves to a third level in the conviction that those who have
been drawn into these emotions in the theatre will respond in the same
way when things go wrong in real life; their reason will have become the
slave of their passions:
Few are capable of rellt'cling that what we enjoy in others will inevi-
tably reart upon ourselves. For after It·eding filt the elllotion of pity
there [at the theatre], it is not easy to restrain it in our own suflerings.
(rio(;b)
In spite of what is comll1only said, the Rrpublic Book X does not say
that poets are to be banished tout court fi'om the ideal city. Nor, in spite
of the claim that the mimetic artist is "three rellloves fi'olll the king and
truth" (597e), does Plato object to mimesis as such. Poetl'y and music,
including mimetic art, will have a full place, but everything depends
on their having the appropriate 1(>rI1I and imitating the right sort of
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behaviour: no flutes allowed, no modes of music other than the Dorian
and the Phrygi<ln, and no wringing of hands! The worry that a painting
involves illusion-that children seeing a painted ship on a p<linted ocean
might think that they are at the seaside-is readily set aside. Mimetic
art is perfectly all right it: tilr eX<lmple, it shows a brave man engaged
unsuccessfully in wartilre or meeting mistilrtune or death with equa-
nimity (such as Socrates at his trial in the Ap%g)' or tall,ing with com-
panions on the day of his death in the Phal't!o). The law of the ideal city
sets a demanding test f(w lite and t(lr the art which is to imitate life:
The law... ,kclarl's that it is ht'st to kt'l'p ljllil't as tar as possible ill
calamity and lIot to chafe alld rl'pillt', hl'callsl' Wt' cannot l\llow what is
n:ally good allli t'vil ill slich thill~s alld it is of 110 advantag-t: to liS to
tukt' thl'lll hard; and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great conct'rn;
alld grief will gt't ill tlit' \\'a)' of taking the Ilt'ct'ssary IlIl'aSlIrt:S to cope
with the situation. (fiOk)
It is import<lnt to remember that Plato's argument <lbout an ideal city-
state is situated consciously in the historical and cultural context of
Athens. From that standpoint, he makes clear th<lt none of the great
writers of Greece would escape banishment. Homer must go, and
Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, <lnd of course Aristophanes and the
writers of comedy who, while being less serious, are no less blame-
worthy in indulging the ditlerent range of emotions associated with
butli)onery and impudence ((j()(jc). One who goes to too many plays by
Aristophanes will be consllllled by the spirit of levity!
Plato is not wrong of course in supposing that there are situations
in which the expression of emotions runs to excess in the theatre. ~or
is he wrong in supposing that music and the other arts ('mTy emotional
force and influence beh<l\·iour. The difliculty is in understanding why he
considers that the poetry and theatl'e of which he W<lS critical h<ld any-
thing like the deleterious etlects attributed to it, either in the irllllledi<lte
experience of the majority of Athenians or in their subsequent behav-
iour. His argument is presented in the name of reason and measured
restraint. Rut it is driven by deep emotional judgment. Plato's response
to tragedy, as much drama as philosophy at critical points, thus exhibits
the very fill/It with which poetry itself is charged. This response is
generated in part, as suggested earlier, by Plato's general disdain for
the social and political order in which the art of tragedy emile to be
celebrated. Also at stal,e is a competition for the minds of the young,
another domain in which emotions lIIay run high.
That Greel, tragedy was a deeply moving experience filr actors
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and audience is clear. But no less clearly it was essentially a drama
of words and action and a theatre of ideas built around the power of
stories typically concerned with critical points of conflict in individual,
family, and social life (issues of particular relevance in the democracy).
In commenting- on the calling of the poet, Aristophanes said that "we
must indeed say things that are good, because to the young it is the
schoolteacher who speaks, but to those who arc past puberty it is poets"
(Frogs, 105:3-55). From an early stage, Athenian dramatists were regu-
larly acknowledged as 'the teachers of the people'. Tragedy, as Simon
Goldhill says, "rapidly entered the formal and inf()rmal teaching institu-
tions: it was learnt for performance at symposia, read and studied, and
from the fourth century on widdy disseminated throughout the Greek
world....'
Specifically, one of the significant themes of tragedy concerns the
transition of the young male into adult society (as in Philor.tetes, the
second and third plays of the Oresteia, Oedipus (in a sense), Hippo~ytus
and Bace/we). The focus of Phi/oeletes in particulnr is the education of
Neoptolemus at the hands of the wily Odysseus. Ephebes, young men
on the threshold of public life, were accorded a significant place in the
Great Dionysia; and indeed one of the many theories about the origin
of trag-edy links it with rituals of adolescent initiation. One supposes
that the young men at Plato's Academy would have attended the per-
f(Jrmances, not least the regular' re"j"als of the plays of Aeschylus,
Sophocles and Euripides, and argued about the issues portrayed, even
if they were not among "those who run about to all the Dionysiac
fCstivals... whether in town or country" (47 ud). For Plato, the head of
an institution concel'/led with preparing the young lor public life in a
democracy of which he is distrustful, the poet is thus a rival "legislator
of the word" (Laws, 858c). A writer of dramatic power, Plato responds
by drawing- heavily on the emotions in a complex dialectic in which the
emotions are portrayed as pitted against reason and truth.
Aristotle's philosophical writing lacks the dramatic power and emo-
tional force of his teacher. Hut his teaching in psychology and ethics
puts stress on the emotions as an integral part of the psyche and
human life along with reason: "the irrational passions are thought not
less human than reason is, and therefeJl'e also the actions which proceed
fi'olll ang-er or appetite are properly human actions" (Nicomacheilll Ethics,
1I 11 b 1-3). The emotions may of course be out of order, lililing by
defect in some cases or, more cOlllmonly, running to excess. Nonethe-
less the experience of emotion around the poles of pleasure and pain
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is central to a worthwhile human life, I()r the morally mature person is
identified as OIW who experiences pleasurc and pain rightly. Specifically,
the emotions are accorded a signilicant cognitive component as incorpo-
rating beliefs and judgments about the world around us; this is the basis
for an account in which thought and emotion are interdependent and
capable of integration, a consideration which is critical, in turn, to his
treatment of the tragic emotions of pity and fear.
In the f;lmous definition of tragedy in chapter 0 of the Poetics, pity
and fear are cited as the aflective response to tragedy, .....with incidents
arousing pity and lear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such
cmotions" (I +~9b~7-9). The first thing of note in the discussion of pity
and lear-to which Aristotle turns in chapter 9-is that it is part of a
more general treatment of the elements and pattcrns of tragic plots
and what is to be aimed at in the characters of tragedy. Tragedy is "a
mimesis not only of a colnplete action, but also of fearful and pitilid
cvents, which is eflected most strongly when events occur unexpectedly
hut on account of one anothcr" (H5~a1-3). Hegularly in this context,
he speaks of "Iearful and pitiful events" in the action of the play rather
than of pity and lear as eHects on the audience. The f(xce of this, in
Halli,,·ell's words, "is to insinuate the close and necessary connec-
tion between the tragic emotions and the internal construction of the
drama; the capacity to elicit pity and fear is an ol~iective attrihute of the
poetic material as handled by the playwright".G Aristotle points out that
lear and pity may well he aroused by the spectacle-masks, costumes,
gestures and (probably) the stage setting as a whole. But the emphasis
lalls on the poet"s art. The conjuring up of the emotions depends, in
the lirst place, on the skill of the poet in constructing a coherent plot
around events and characters with appropriate language and form; but
then it depends no less on the intelligence of the audience to I()llow
what is going on and to respond accordingly.
In tragedy, the emotions arc generated precisely in the experience of
mimesis. The psychology of the emotions in this context is accompanied
by the theses that poetry, and the arts generally, grow out of the human
capacity for imitation along with harmony and rhythm; that imitation is
natural to human beings from childhood; that to leel pleasure or pain in
imitations is not 1~lr removed from the same feelings about realities (Pol-
itics I :l+Oa2~-5); and that delight in imitation is also natul"al, even when
something painlial is involved For this latter consideration, Aristotle
ollel"s the explanation that, in the expel"ience of mimesis, one is del"iving
satisfaction li'om learning about the world, gathering the meaning of
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things (POdll:S l+l.sll'l.!l). [\'en if this is not the whole story, Aristotle is
on strong ground in holding that, in tragedy, the emotions of pity and
fear are closely associated with a cognitive grasp of what is represented
and with an enlargement of our understanding, especially in relation to
human vulnerability.
The Aristotelian vicw is that fear and pity are the appropriate
response to fearful and pitiful events, in lite as well as in art. The arousal
of emotion is a proper part of the poet's art. This stands in contrast
\\'ith the stern law in the Repuhlic that feelings of this kind are notjusti-
fied, in either sphere, because wc can never l\Ilow whether perceived mis-
fClrtunes arc really misfortunes. So, in Plato's example, a parent should
not feel grief at the death of a child because there is no knowing what is
really good and bad in these matters. One could argue that this thesis is
self:'dcleating as an attempt to escape the conditions fill' tragedy. For if
it is correct, it is our misfortune not to be able to rely on our judgments
about misfortune and to have to live with the uncertainty of never
knowing what is really good and bad in the eVents that befiillus.
The fundamental objection to the tragic emotions in the llepuhlic
rests on a strong thesis about the e!lects of art on life: feeling pleasurc
and abandoning ourselves in sympathetic response to the mimesis of
grief in the theatre leads to similar loss of control in life. Aristotle's
response to this alarmist picture of what happens in the theatre is incli-
cated in part in what he says about the cognitive-and ethical-dimen-
sions of emotion. His brief and enigmatic remark about the "catharsis
of such emotions" in the definition of tragedy is also, almost certainly,
relevant to this topic. \Vhat is meant by "catharsis" in this context has
been notoriously sul~iect to dispute. But there is good reason to suppose
that Aristotle put it filrward in opposition to the Platonist illlage of the
tragic emotions running out of control. \Vhere Plato speaks of "feeding
fat the emotion of pity" at the tragic theatre, Aristotle rallis of its
catharsis of the elliot ions. \Vhat did he mean?
An adequate discussion of the topic would involve reference to a
complex background in Greek Illedicine and religious ritual, Pythago-
rean ideas about the cathartic role of music, and specifically Aristotle's
references to catharsis elsewhere, notably in the Politics Hook VIII where
he is dealing with the role of music in developing emotional sensibilities
and contributing to the acquisition of virtue. That is a large task, not to
be undertaken here. Rut in the context of Aristotle's general account of
the emotions and of mimetic experience, in tragedy in particular, there
is no basis fClr the view that catharsis llleallS something like the clearing
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Ollt of overcharged feelings: the Platonist view that an excess of feeling
is typical of the experience of tragedy is not conceded in the first place;
in any case, that view cannot account t()r the inclusion of "catharsis" in
the definition. The best clue, as Stephen Halliwell argues, is to associate
dramatic catharsis in the Poetics with the process attributed to music in
the Politics. This suggests
that tragic katharsis in some sense conduces to the ethical alignmclll
between the emotions and rcason: because tragt'dy arouscs pity and
fear by appropriate means, it does not, as Plato alleged, "water" or teed
the emotions, but tends to harmonise them with our perceptions and
judgments of the world.';
Tragedy arouses pity and fear, and in a way that enriches our under-
standing of their place in human lite.
Plato consistently presents philosophy and tragedy as rivals in a
competition in which there is room ttl!' only one point of view. In its
most bizarre expression in the Laws, the rivalry is placed in the domain
of politics as poetry, in which the envisaged state is a mimesis of the
best and noblest lite concei\'ed as the very truth of tragedy: "You [the
tragic poetsJ are poets, and we also are poets in the same style, rival
artists and rival actors, and that in the finest of all dramas, one which
indeed can be produced only by a code of true law" (81 ib). In this world
of opposition the poets may be accorded a chorus only if they speak the
language of philosophy and conform to the philosophers' law.
Aristotle is at one with Plato in thinking of philosophy as the arbiter
of knowledge and wisdom. Hut in place of an original opposition
between philosophy and poetry he invokes the idea of a shared nature.
For he holds that poetry, dealing with what might happen, with what is
possible, with what is universal rather than particular in human experi-
ence, is itself broadly philosophical in character. Aristotle recognises
and pays tribute to the specific skills of the poet's art and he finds in
tragedy a distinct source of Imowledge and wisdom, in which the emo-
tions arc centrally involved. This was a judgment that Plato, in certain
of his writings at least, r~iected with an excess of emotion.
NOTES
1 References to Plato arc taken li'\lI11 The Dialogues '11'1alo, translated hy B. Jowell
(OxllJrlJ: Oxll>r<1 Uni"ersily Press, 1~),91), cited in lhe hody of' Ihe leXI in lhe Illl'ln
standard!y "sed in editions of the dialog""s.
2 Goldhill, "The audience of Alhenian tragedy", in P. E. Easlerling (cd.), The Cambridge
Companion 10 Greek Tragr."}' (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, I[ifi,),
p.,';';.
164
PAUL CRITTENDEN
:l H~ler~nces to t\rislOtle are frolll The Hevise" Oxt(>rd Translation of The Complele
frorks ifArislotle, edited by Jonathan Hames, 2 volllllles (princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, \!)8+). Helerences will he incorporated illto the text in the t()rtn stan-
dardly lIsed in editions of:\risrotl,"s writings.
+ Halliwell. !Inslolle's J'ot!l;cs (London: DlId\\\'orrh, 1~.J8(;). p.I(i~J.
[> Goldhill. 'The ;",dience of t\thenian tragecly", 1'.(;7.
G Ilalliwell, Arislolle's Poelics, 1'.171.
7 Halliwell, ,4n~'lolle's Poelics, p.20 I.
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